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Abstract—This paper examines the result of the experimental
research on the ultimatum games through simulation analysis.
To do so, we develop agent-based simulation system imitating
the behavior of human subjects in the laboratory experiment
by implementing a learning mechanism involving a concept of
fairness. In our agent-based simulation system, mechanisms
of decision making and learning are constructed on the basis
of neural networks and genetic algorithms.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we develop a multi-agent simulation system
for analyzing behavior of players in the ultimatum games.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game,
player 1 who is a proposer obtains almost all the payoff
which is divided between players 1 and 2, and player 2
accepts the offer of player 1. It is known from the results
of the experimental investigations of the past that the sub-
game perfect equilibrium does not accurately forecast the
ultimatum play, and the payoff is divided almost equally.
A diversified range of experiments have been accumulated
in order to examine why outcomes of the games deviate
from the subgame perfect equilibrium [4, 8, 11, 13, 14,
15, 17, 20, 21], where the following issues are focused
on: fairness of players, the number of rounds of the game,
difference in nations or races, the right to be player 1, the
structural power of player 1, anonymity of play, punishment
for unfair proposals, magnitude of payoff, and so forth.
Bolton [2] tries to explain the experimental results by using
a utility function of a player which is influenced not only
by a payoff of the player but also by a payoff of the op-
ponent; the utility function is defined by the payoff of the
player and the ratio of the payoff of the player to that of the
opponent. Moreover, Bolton and Ockenfels [3] extend this
model to games with incomplete information. Rabin [18]
define a fairness equilibrium by using a utility function of
the payoff of self and the kindness to the opponent, and
consider some economic examples. Fehr and Schmidt [7]
consider fairness, competition and cooperation in the eco-
nomic environment by using a utility function defined by
the payoff of self and a difference between the payoff of self
and that of the opponent. Costa-Gomes and Zauner [5] at-
tempt to explain the experimental data of Roth et al. [20]
by a utility function with the payoffs of two players and
a random disturbance term.
Concerning approaches without any utility function, Roth
and Erev [19] propose a simple learning model based on
reinforcement learning. Gale et al. [9] show that replica-
tor dynamics leads not to the subgame perfect equilibrium,
but to the Nash equilibria; they suggest that researchers
should give attention to not always the subgame perfect
equilibrium but also the Nash equilibria in evaluating the
experimental data. Incorporating the quantal response equi-
libria (QRE) model [16], Yi [22] attempts to explain the
experimental result of the ultimatum games.
Abbink et al. [1] compare an approach based on the utility
function with an approach based on adaptive learning; they
argue the abilities and limitations of both approaches. From
these research results, it seems to be desirable to incorpo-
rate both concepts of fairness and learning for modeling
the behavior of players in the ultimatum game. In this pa-
per, we develop a simulation system with artificial adaptive
agents which have a decision making and learning mech-
anism based on neural networks (e.g., [12]) and a genetic
algorithm (e.g., [10]). By employing the utility function
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt [7] as a fitness function of
the genetic algorithm, fairness is incorporated in the learn-
ing mechanism of the artificial agents. In our system for
simulation of the ultimatum games, an action of an agent is
determined by a vector of outputs from a nonlinear function
with several input data that agents can know after playing
a stage game; this decision mechanism is implemented by
a neural network. The artificial agents with chromosomes
consisting of the synaptic weights and thresholds character-
izing the neural network are evolved so as to obtain larger
payoffs through a genetic algorithm, and then this learning
mechanism develops agents with better performance.
To imitate the behavior of human subjects in a laboratory
experiment and examine the result of the experiment by
using the agent-based simulation system, we use the data
from the experiment by Roth et al. [20], and identify the
standard set of the parameters in the utility function in-
corporating fairness by Fehr and Schmidt [7]. Moreover,
by varying the values of the parameters, we evaluate the
effect of each individual parameter on the behavior of the
artificial agents.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we describe the ultimatum game and briefly review the ex-
perimental result of the ultimatum game by Roth et al. [20].
Section 3 is devoted to describing the agent-based simula-
tion system with the learning mechanism and the utility
function incorporating fairness. In Section 4, we exam-
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ine the results of the simulations; finally in Section 5, we
give a summary of the simulations and some concluding
remarks.
2. The ultimatum game
We deal with an ultimatum game in which two players di-
vide $10. In this game, player 1 who is the first mover
makes an offer (x1,x2 = 10− x1), x2 ∈ {1, . . . ,10}, and
player 2 who is the second mover accepts or rejects the
offer (x1,x2); if player 2 accepts, players 1 and 2 obtain
pi1 = x1 and pi2 = x2, respectively; otherwise they obtain
nothing, pi1 = pi2 = 0. It is noted that the offer of 0 by
player 1 is removed from a list of possible offers; this set-
ting is also used in the ultimatum game in [6]. In Fig. 1,
a game tree of the ultimatum game is depicted. Because
player 2’s payoff by acceptance is larger than that by re-
jection in any of player 2’s nodes, the subgame perfect
equilibrium is player 1’s offer of ($9,$1) and acceptance
of player 2; the pair of the equilibrium payoffs is ($9,$1).
Fig. 1. Game tree of the ultimatum game.
We review and summarize the result of the experiment by
Roth et al. [20], where the experiment about bargaining
and market behavior is conducted in four countries: Israel,
Japan, the United State, and Yugoslavia. As a practical
matter, in the experiment $10 is represented as 1000 to-
kens, and all offers are made in multiples of 5 tokens.
There are three sessions of the ultimatum game; in each
session, about 20 subjects are recruited and the game is
played 10 rounds; a pair of players are randomly matched
at each round. Because any offer is available only in in-
crements of $1 in our simulation, we use the discretized
data of the experiment shown in [5] and we take the av-
erage after pooling all the data of the four countries. The
result of the experiment compatible with the setting of our
simulation is shown in Fig. 2, where the data of $1 cor-
respond to offers from 0 token to 150 tokens, the data
of $2 correspond to offers from 155 tokens to 250 tokens,
and so forth, because the minimum offer is set to $1 in our
setting.
Fig. 2. Summary of the result of the experiment with human
subjects.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, only about 4% of all the offers
correspond to the subgame perfect equilibrium and the rate
of acceptance for the corresponding offers is 31%. This
fact is not consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium
prediction. The offers of $4 or $5 account for 68% of
all the offers, and therefore player 1 seems to be making
relatively fair offers. The rate of acceptance by player 2 for
offers larger than or equal to $4 is over 75%.
Although any offers by player 1 a quota of player 2 of
which is smaller than or equal to $1 brings a positive pay-
off to player 2, player 2 rejects it at the rate of 70%. This
behavior can be interpreted as punishment for unfair pro-
posals by player 1. By using utility functions defined by
not only the payoff of self but also the payoff of the
opponent, explanations of such behavior have been at-
tempted [2, 3, 5, 7, 18].
3. Agent-based simulation model
In this paper, because it is supposed that human behavior is
adaptive, we employ a simulation model which is a natural
framework to implement the adaptive behavior of individ-
uals. In our simulation model, each agent has a decision
making mechanism built by a neural network (e.g., [12])
and a learning mechanism based on a genetic algorithm
(e.g., [10]).
3.1. Decision making by a neural network
An agent corresponds to a neural network which is charac-
terized by synaptic weights between two nodes in the neural
network and thresholds which are parameters for the output
function of nodes. Because a structure of neural networks
is determined by the number of layers and the number of
nodes in each layer, an agent is prescribed by the fixed
number of parameters if these numbers are fixed. Forming
a string consisting of these parameters which is identified
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with an artificial agent, we think of the string as a chro-
mosome of the agent in an artificial genetic system of our
simulation model. In our simulation model for analyzing
behavior of players in the ultimatum games, two types of
agents are required. The first one which is called agent 1
corresponds to player 1 who makes an offer to player 2; the
second one which is called agent 2 corresponds to player 2
who accepts or rejects the offer by player 1.
3.1.1. Decision making of agent 1
The structure of a neural network of agent 1 is depicted
in the diagram of Fig. 3a. Agent 1 makes an offer corre-
sponding to the largest output among all the ten outputs of
the neural network, where the outputs outs, s = 1, . . . ,10
correspond to from the offer (9,1) to the offer (0,10); the
offer (10− s∗,s∗) with the largest output outs∗ is chosen as
the next offer of agent 1.
Inputs of the neural network for agent 1 is summarized as
follows.
[Input 1] an offer by agent 1 in the last game:
x1 ∈ {9,8, . . . ,0}1 .
[Input 2] a payoff obtained by agent 1 in the last game:
pi1 ∈ {9,8, . . . ,0}.
[Input 3] agent 2’s choice between acceptance and rejec-
tion in the last game: y2 ∈ {0, 1}; 0 means re-
jection, and 1 means acceptance.
[Input 4] a payoff obtained by agent 2 in the last game:
pi2 ∈ {1,2, . . . ,10}.
[Input 5] the average payoff obtained by agent 1 in the
past all games: p¯i1 ∈ [0,9].
[Input 6] the average payoff obtained by agent 2 in the
past all games: p¯i2 ∈ [0,10].
[Input 7] the average offer of agent 1 in the past all
games: x¯1 ∈ [0,9].
[Input 8] the average rate of acceptance by agent 2 for
the offers in the past all games: y¯2 ∈ [0,1].
It should be noted that the average payoff p¯i1 and the av-
erage offer x¯1 are memorized and updated by agent 1, and
similarly the average payoff p¯i2 and the average rate of ac-
ceptance y¯2 are memorized and updated by agent 2.
3.1.2. Decision making of agent 2
Agent 2 also makes a decision in a way similar to agent 1;
8 inputs of all the 9 inputs of the neural network for agent 2
are the same as those of agent 1, and the other one is an
offer by agent 1 in the current game. The output layer of
the neural network of agent 2 consists of two nodes which
correspond to the choices of acceptance and rejection for
the offer. The structure of the neural network of agent 2
1Although an offer is represented by a pair (x1, x2) in the previous
section, the offer (x1, x2) is identified only with x1 because x2 = 1− x1.
is depicted in the diagram of Fig. 3b. Inputs of the neural
network for agent 2 are summarized as follows.
[Inputs 1–8] the same as the inputs of agent 1.
[Input 9] an offer by agent 1 in the current game:
xˆ1 ∈ {9,8, . . . ,0}.
Fig. 3. Neural networks for (a) agent 1 and (b) agent 2.
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3.2. Utility function incorporating fairness
For modeling the behavior of players in the ultimatum
game, we consider that it is appropriate to incorporate both
learning and fairness in the artificial adaptive agent model
simultaneously. To implement the concept of fairness, we
use utility function as a fitness function in the genetic al-
gorithm which is the basis of the learning mechanism of
our agent-based simulation system. As a utility function
appropriate for this purpose, we employ the utility function
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt [7]; the parameters of the
function seems to be easy to interpret because the function
is linear, and the excess of the payoff of the opponent over
that of self and the reciprocal excess are separated.
When players i and j obtain payoffs pii and pi j, respectively,
the utility ui of player i is represented as
ui(pii,pi j) = pii−αi max{pi j−pii,0}−βi max{pii−pi j,0},
i, j = 1,2, i 6= j, (1)
where αi and βi are coefficients; the utility ui(pii,pi j) of
player i consists of the payoff of self, the penalty for the
excess of the payoff of the opponent over that of self, and
the penalty for the reciprocal excess. When the payoff of
self exceeds that of the opponent, i.e., pii > pi j, ui(pii,pi j) =
pii−βi(pii−pi j); when the payoff of the opponent exceeds
that of self, i.e., pi j > pii, ui(pii,pi j) = pii−αi(pi j −pii).
3.3. Evolutionary learning through the genetic
algorithm
An agent is prescribed by the fixed number of parameters
in our agent-based simulation system. Forming a string
consisting of these parameters, we use the string as a chro-
mosome in an artificial genetic system. As we mentioned
above, for agent 1, there are the 8 units in the input layer
and the 10 units in the output layer. Let h1 be the num-
ber of units in the hidden layer. Then because the number
of links between nodes is 18h1 and the number of units
in the hidden and the output layers is h1 + 10, the neural
network corresponding to an agent can be governed by the
synaptic weights w1l , l = 1, . . . ,18h1 and the thresholds θ 1l ,
l = 1, . . . ,h1 +10. Similarly, for agent 2, the neural network
is also governed by the synaptic weights w2l , l = 1, . . . ,11h2
and the thresholds θ 2l , l = 1, . . . ,h2 +2, where h1 and h2 are
the numbers of nodes in the hidden layers. These parame-
ters and the input values determine an action of the agent,
and the synaptic weights and the thresholds are adjusted
through the genetic algorithm so that the initial popula-
tion evolves into the population of agents obtaining larger
payoffs.
We separately arrange two subpopulations of agents 1
and 2; there are N agents in each subpopulation. One
agent is selected from each subpopulation, and two agents
make a pair for playing the game. Agents repeatedly paly
the ultimatum game, and accumulate the payoffs obtained
in each stage game. Because the value of the utility Eq. (1)
is directly used as a fitness in the artificial genetic system,
agents obtaining larger utilities are likely to survive.
We start by describing how the parameters prescribing an
agent are initialized. In the experiment, because experi-
menters explain a procedure of the ultimatum game, sub-
jects should understand the payoff structure of the game.
Thus, it is not appropriate that artificial agents start to play
the game without any prior knowledge of the game; we give
the artificial agents some knowledge of the game before
playing it. We implement this by adjusting the parameters
of the neural network which are the synaptic weights and
the thresholds through the error back propagation algorithm
(e.g., [12]) with the teacher signals.
A chromosome of agent 1 consists of the synaptic weights
w1l , l = 1, . . . ,18h1 and the thresholds θ 1l , l = 1, . . . ,h1 +10,
and that of agent 2 consists of the synaptic weights w2l ,
l = 1, . . . ,11h2 and the thresholds θ 2l , l = 1, . . . ,h2 +2. Ini-
tial values of the parameters wil and θ il are set to random
values in [−1,1] before the adjustment by the error back
propagation algorithm.
We give teacher signals to the neural network for agent 1 so
as to make offers yielding larger payoffs of self. Because
the outputs out11,out
1
2, . . . ,out
1
10 of the neural network for
agent 1 correspond to the offers (9,1),(8,2), . . . ,(0,10),
the teacher signals of 1,8/9, . . . ,0 are given to the outputs
out11,out
1
2, . . . ,out
1
10 for any set of the inputs given at ran-
dom.
For agent 2, based on the experimental results, the param-
eters of the neural network is adjusted by using the error
back propagation algorithm such that the possibility of ac-
Fig. 4. Flowchart of the agent-based simulation model.
39
Tomohiro Hayashida, Ichiro Nishizaki, and Hideki Katagiri
ceptance is equal to that of rejection for the most unfair offer
(10,0), the possibility of acceptance increases as the payoff
of agent 2 in an offer becomes larger, and agent 2 perfectly
accepts the profitable offers with agent 2’s quotas larger
than 6. To be more precise, when input 9 corresponding to
agent 1’s quota in an offer is xˆ1 and inputs 1 to 8 are ran-
domly given, the teacher signal, 112 (10− xˆ1)+0.5, is given
to the output out21 corresponding to acceptance of an offer,
and the teacher signal to the output out22 is a complement
of 112(10− xˆ1)+ 0.5 on 1.
We arrange 30 sets of the teacher signals for each of
agents 1 and 2, and the parameters of the neural networks
are adjusted by the error back propagation algorithm. In
our agent-based simulation system, there are two subpopu-
lations of N agents for agents 1 and 2, and one agent from
the subpopulation of agent 1 and one from the subpopula-
tion of agent 2 are randomly chosen, and then one pair for
playing the game is formed. The game is played by N pairs
of agents 1 and 2 according to the above mentioned deci-
sion making mechanism. The utilities of agents 1 and 2
are determined by Eq. (1) depending on the outcome of
the game; these utilities are directly used as the fitness in
the genetic algorithm. Because it is known that the algo-
rithm works effectively by enlargement and reduction of the
values of the fitness [10], in our system the fitness is lin-
early scaled. A procedure of the simulation model is sum-
marized in the following and is diagrammatically shown
in Fig. 4.
Step 1: Generation of the initial population. For each
of agents 1 and 2, N individuals are generated.
Step 2: Preliminary learning. By using the error back
propagation algorithm with given teacher signals,
the parameters of the neural network for each in-
dividual are adjusted.
Step 3: Formation of pairs for the game. A pair for
playing the game is formed by selecting one agent
from each of the subpopulations of agents 1 and 2;
by repeating this operation, N pairs are formed.
Step 4: Playing the ultimatum game. In each of the
N pairs, the ultimatum game is played; the de-
cision of each agent is determined by the outputs
of the neural network; and artificial agents obtain
their utilities depending on an outcome (pi1,pi2) of
the game.
Step 5: Genetic operation. The two subpopulations for
agents 1 and 2 are formed again by gathering the
same type of artificial agents from the N pairs
for playing the game; the genetic operations are
executed to each subpopulation consisting of N in-
dividuals. The utility Eq. (1) of agent 1 or 2 is
directly used as the fitness of an artificial agent in
the genetic algorithm, and the fitness is linearly
scaled.
If the number of periods reaches a given final gen-
eration of the simulation, the procedure stops.
Step 5-1: Reproduction. As a reproduction operator, the
roulette wheel selection is adopted. By a roulette




, i = 1,2, (2)
each chromosome is selected into the next gen-
eration, where fi j is the fitness of the jth indi-
vidual of agent i.
Step 5-2: Crossover. A single-point crossover operator is
applied to any pair of chromosomes with the
probability of crossover pc. Namely, a point of
crossover on the chromosomes is randomly se-
lected and then two new chromosomes are cre-
ated by swapping subchromosomes which are
the right side parts of the selected point of
crossover on the original chromosomes.
For offsprings of agent 1, the average payoff and
the average offer are given by averaging those of
the parents with the probabilities corresponding
to the sizes of the swapped subchromosomes;
similarly, for agent 2, the average payoff and the
average rate of acceptance are calculated.
Step 5-3: Mutation. With a given small probability
of mutation pm, each gene which represents
a synaptic weight or a threshold in a chromo-
some is randomly changed. The selected gene
is replaced by a random number in [−1,1].
4. Results of the simulations
We develop the artificial agents in this agent-based simula-
tion system so as to imitate the behavior of human subjects
in a laboratory experiment by Roth et al. [20], and examine
the result of the experimental research through the simu-
lation analysis. First, we identify the standard set of the
four parameters α1, β1, α2, β2 in the utility function (1) by
minimizing the error of mean square between the result of
the simulation and that of the experiment. After identified
the the standard set of the parameters, we examine effect
of the parameters characterizing the behavior of the human
subjects.
Artificial adaptive agents have mechanisms of decision
making and learning based on a neural network and a ge-
netic algorithm, and the parameters of the neural network
and the genetic algorithm are set to the following values:
– the number of nodes in the neural network for
agent 1:
8 in the input layer, 10 in the hidden layer, 10 in the
output layer;
– the number of nodes in the neural network for
agent 2:
9 in the input layer, 11 in the hidden layer, 2 in the
output layer;
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– the size of subpopulations for agents 1 and 2:
N = 100;
– the maximal generation of the genetic algorithms:
MaxGen = 3000;
– the parameters of genetic operations:
crossover pc = 0.5, mutation pm = 0.001, generation
gap g = 0.8.
In this paper, the simulation system is executed 100 runs
for each setting of the parameters. Because all prepara-
tory runs converge at certain level until 2500 periods, we
set the maximal generation of the simulation to 3000 pe-
riods. Numerical data of the simulation are given by av-
eraging each observed value in the last 150 generations of
the 100 runs.
4.1. Identification of the standard set of the parameters
By varying values of the parameters, we find the standard
set of the parameters approximating the behavior of human
subjects. There are four parameters α1, β1, α2 and β2 in
the utility function, and especially, the parameter β2 is the
penalty coefficient for the excess of the payoff of player 2’s
self over the payoff of the opponent in the utility function
of player 2. When player 1 makes an offer such that the
payoff of player 2 is larger than the payoff of player 1’s self,
i.e., (x1, x2), x1 < x2, this penalty is valid. Although it is
true that such an offer is unfair, it is not natural that player 2
is penalized for accepting the offer. From this reason, fix-
ing the value of β2 at β2 = 0, the values of α1 and β1
are varied from 0 to 1 at intervals of 0.1, and the value
of α2 is varied from 0 to 2.
In order to find the standard set of the parameters imitating
the behavior of human subjects and successfully approxi-
mating the result of the experiment, we use the error of

















where psubx1 and p
sim
x1 are the fraction of the human subjects
and the artificial agents making an offer x1 ∈ {9,8, . . . ,0}
in the experiment and in the simulation, respectively;
qsubx1 and q
sim
x1 are the fraction of the human subjects and
the artificial agents accepting the offer x1 in the experiment
and in the simulation, respectively.
By executing 100 runs for all the 2541 cases of param-
eter variations, it is found that the standard set of the
parameters is (α1,β1,α2,β2) = (0.4,0,1.1,0) minimizing
the error of mean square Eq. (3) and the minimum is
E(α1,β1,α2,β2) = 0.1263; at the standard set of the pa-
rameters (α1,β1,α2,β2) = (0.4,0,1.1,0), the distribution
of offers by agent 1 and the rate of acceptance for any offer
are given in Fig. 5 with the behavior of human subjects in
the experiment. The values of the parameters in the util-
ity function of agent 1 are α1 = 0.4 and β1 = 0, and the
penalty is not larger than 40% of the excess of the payoff
of an agent over that of the other. In contrast, the value
of the coefficient β2 = 1.1 in the utility function of agent 2
are considerably large, and therefore it appears that agent 2
strongly ask the opponent for a fair offer compared with
agent 1.
Fig. 5. Behavior of artificial agents and human subjects at the
standard set of the parameters: (a) distribution of offers; (b) rate
of acceptance.
The behavior of agents 1 and 2 can be characterized by the
distribution of offers and the rate of acceptance, respec-
tively. As can be seen in Fig. 5, all in all, the behavior of
artificial agents in the simulation successfully approximates
that of human subjects in the experiment. We will begin
by examining the offers by agent 1. The frequencies of the
offers in which the quota of agent 1 is larger than 4, x1 > 4,
by the artificial agents in the simulation are similar to those
by the human subjects in the experiments. For the offers
such that the quota of agent 1 is smaller than or equal to 4,
x1 ≤ 4, the behavior of the artificial agents in the simula-
tion is almost the same as that of the human subjects in
the experiment. Next, we look into the rate of acceptance.
For the offers in which the quota of agent 1 is larger than
or equal to 4, x1 ≥ 4, both of the rates of the simulation
and the experiment denote a similar tendency; for the other
offers, x1 ≤ 3, however, the rate of the simulation is slightly
smaller than that of the experiment. This is attributed to
the fact that as seen in the graph of Fig. 5a, the offers in
which the quota of agent 1 is smaller than or equal to 4
are hardly proposed in the simulation and therefore the ar-
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tificial agents cannot sufficiently learn how they respond
such offers.
In Fig. 6, we show transitions of the average offer by agent 1
and the average rate of acceptance by agent 2 in the early
Fig. 6. Transitions of the average offer and acceptance rate.
generations of the simulation. As seen in the figure, at the
beginning of the simulation, agent 1 makes the offer (9,1)
and agent 2 accepts it with the probability of about 0.55;
it is conceivable that the couple of these actions is due
to the preliminary learning of the neural network. Just
after the start of the learning by the genetic algorithm,
agent 2 begins to reject extremely unfair offers such as the
offer (9,1). However, as a quota x1 of agent 1 in an offer
(x1,x2) decreases by a high incidence of rejection of unfair
offers by agent 2, the rate of acceptance of the offer in-
creases; after 150 generations, the average offer by agent 1
converges to an appreciably fair offer (6.15,3.85) and the
average rate of acceptance by agent 2 also converges to
about 0.68.
Table 1
Utilities of agents 1 and 2 at the standard set
of the parameters
x1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
u1 9 8 7 6 5 3.2 1.4 −0.4 −2.2 −4.0
u2 −7.8 −4.6 −1.4 1.8 5 6 7 8 9 10
In Table 1, the utilities of agents 1 and 2 are shown
at the standard set of the parameters (α1,β1,α2,β2) =
(0.4,0,1.1,0). As seen in the table, the utility of agent 1 is
an increasing function with the quota x1 of agent 1; the util-
ity of agent 2 is a decreasing function with x1. Especially,
because the value of α2, which is the penalty coefficient
for the excess of the payoff of agent 1 over the payoff of
agent 2’s self in the utility of agent 2, is relatively large,
the utilities of agent 2 become negative when the quota
x1 of agent 1 is larger than or equal to 7, x1 ≥ 7. From
the fact that the utility of agent 2 is zero when agent 2
rejects an offer, it is preferable for agent 2 to reject such
offers. Such behavior of agent 2 can be interpreted as the
punishment for unfair proposals by agent 1. As can be seen
in Fig. 6, through the repeated rejections by agent 2, agent 1
gradually lowers a quota of agent 1’s self in offers. This
process can be explained by the learning of agent 1. For
the offer (6,4), conversely it is advantageous for agent 2 to
accept it. It seems to be for this reason that the frequency
of the offer (6,4) is the largest.
From the result of the simulation, it is conceivable that
the developed agent-based simulation system successfully
approximates the behavior of human subjects in the experi-
ment by incorporating the fairness in the learning mech-
anism of the artificial agents. Moreover, while Abbink
et al. [1] conclude that a fairness motive is a better ex-
planation for why player 2 rejects unfair offers compared
with learning, our result is consistent with their argument.
While we have found the standard set of the parameters
imitating the behavior of human subjects by varying values
of the parameters, we should examine effects of individual
parameters on the behavior of the artificial agents. To verify
that the behavior of agent 1 is mainly revised through the
learning, by varying values of the parameters α1 and β1
in the utility function of agent 1, we examine change of
the behavior of the artificial agents. Moreover, while we
suppose that fairness and the corresponding punishment
largely explain the behavior of agent 2, to confirm this
argument, we also investigate change of the behavior of the
artificial agents by varying value of the parameter α2 in the
utility function of agent 2.
4.2. Effect of learning on the behavior of agent 1
Fixing the values of α1, α2 and β2 at the standard setting
α1 = 0.4, α2 = 1.1 and β2 = 0, we vary the value of β1 from
0 to 0.5 at intervals of 0.1. The result of this treatment is
given in Fig. 7 showing the average offer and the average
rate of acceptance.
Fig. 7. Change of the behavior with respect to the parameter β1:
(a) average offer; (b) rate of acceptance.
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As can be seen in Fig. 7, the average quota x1 of agent 1 in
offers remains almost the same in the range 0.0≤ β1 ≤ 0.4;
when β1 = 0.5, because the number of agent 1 making
fairer offers increases, the average quota x1 decreases be-
low 6. Although the average rate of acceptance is rel-
atively high when β1 = 0.0 compared with the cases of
β1 = 0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4, the average rates of acceptance are
almost the same when β1 = 0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4. On the other
hand, when β1 = 0.5, because the average quota x1 de-
creases and offers become fair, the average rate of accep-
tance obviously rises.
Fig. 8. Change of the behavior with respect to the parameter α1:
(a) average offer; (b) rate of acceptance.
For sensitivity with respect to the parameter α1, the aver-
age offer and the average rate of acceptance are similarly
given in Fig. 8. As can be seen in Fig. 8, the average
quota x1 of agent 1 in offers remains almost same in
the range 0.0 ≤ α1 ≤ 0.5. Moreover, from the graph of
Fig. 8a, it is found that there is little linkage between
the average rate of acceptance of agent 2 and the change of
the value of α1.
From the above observation, the sensitivity of the behav-
ior of the artificial agents to the change of parameter β1
or α1 from zero is not so high, and it would be said that
introduction of the parameter β1 or α1 does not have a ma-
jor function in explanation of the behavior of the artificial
agents. Thus, the effect of the parameter of fairness is rel-
atively small, and it appears that the behavior of agent 1 is
mainly revised through the learning.
When pi1 > pi2, the utility function of agent 1 is represented
as u1(pi1,pi2) = (1− 2β1)pi1 + 10β1. If β1 < 0.5, because
the coefficient of pi1 is smaller than one, the influence of
agent 2’s decision of acceptance or rejection on the utility of
agent 1 is evidently larger than that of the offer by agent 1’s
self. For the parameter α1, because agent 1 rarely makes
offers such that the quota of agent 1 is smaller than or equal
to 4, x1 ≤ 4, and α1 is valid when pi1 < pi2, the parameter α1
has little influence on the behavior of agent 1. From this
viewpoint, it is also found that the behavior of agent 1 be
strongly affected by learning through a series of actions of
agent 2.
4.3. Effect of punishment on the behavior of agent 2
To observe effect of the punishment on the behavior of
agent 2, we conduct an additional treatment by varying
the value of α2 from 0 to 2 at intervals of 0.1, fixing
the values of α1, β1 and β2 at α1 = 0, β1 = 0 and β2 = 0.
The result of this treatment is given in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. Change of the behavior with respect to the parameter α2:
(a) average offer; (b) rate of acceptance.
As can be seen in Fig. 9, the average quota x1 of agent 1
in offers specifically decreases in the range 0.1 ≤ α2 ≤
0.8, and the average rate of acceptance steeply drops from
α2 = 0.1 to 0.2. It is just conceivable that the behavior
of the artificial agents is very sensitive to the change of
parameter α2 from zero, and the behavior of agent 1 is
mainly explained by introduction of the parameter α2 of
the fairness and punishment.
5. Conclusions
We have developed agent-based simulation system for an-
alyzing the behavior of human subjects in the experi-
ment. The learning mechanism incorporating the concept
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of fairness in the system efficiently works, and it is shown
that our artificial adaptive agents successfully approximates
the behavior of human subjects in the laboratory experi-
ment by Roth et al. [20]. Through the simulation analysis,
we have verified that the behavior of agent 1 is mainly re-
vised through the learning, and fairness and corresponding
punishment largely explain the behavior of agent 2.
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